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Abstract 
This article develops a haircut model by treating repos as debt investments and seeks 
haircuts to control counterparty contingent exposure to asset price gap risk. It corroborates well 
with empirically stylized facts, explains tri-party and bilateral repo haircut differences, recasts 
haircut increases during the financial crisis, and sets a limit on access liquidity dealers can extract 
while acting as funding intermediaries between money market funds and hedge funds. Once a 
haircut is set, repo's residual risk becomes a pricing challenge, as is neither hedgeable nor 
diversifiable. We propose a capital pricing approach of computing repo economic capital and 
charging the borrower a cost of capital. Capital charge is shown to be countercyclical and a key 
element of repo pricing and used in explaining the repo pricing puzzle and maturity compression 
phenomenon.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 Repo's role in leading to the demise of several major financial institutions and near collapse 
of the financial system in 2008 has attracted academic research, regulatory, and industry interests. 
Gorton and Metrick (2012) presented evidence that repo haircuts increased dramatically in the US 
bilateral repo market during the financial crisis, especially those concerning securitization products 
and attributed the crisis to a run on repo. The repo run however is not found in the similarly sized 
tri-party repo market where the repo haircuts barely moved and repo financing for private label 
securitization is of very limited size (Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov 2014).  In the US tri-party 
repo market, unsophisticated cash investors such as money market funds (MMF) usually sign up 
dealer offered haircut schedules but they tend to shut down lending completely rather than trying 
to ask for higher haircuts in time of stress (Copeland, Martin and Walker 2014). Indeed, if we 
simply understand MMFs' shutting down dealer borrowers as another form of repo run, there is no 
disagreement that a run on repo and other short term wholesale funding channels occurred, which 
hit the few most vulnerable dealers including Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, although limited 
in size and only on private label securitization, yet contagious enough to cause systemic distress. 
 Needless to say, it has become a contemporary topic as exactly how or why funding market 
instability such as a repo run could happen. Brunnermerer and Pederson (2009) link market 
liquidity to margins and capital, showing a destabilizing "margin spiral" mechanism through the 
interaction of market liquidity and funding liquidity. The general equilibrium theory with leverage 
impact on asset prices is found fitting squarely during the crisis (Geanakoplos 2010) where a 
downward asset price spiral was obvious in the private label securitization sector. Aiming 
specifically at modeling the repo run, dealers' role as funding intermediaries between cash rich 
money market funds and collateral rich hedge funds (HF) has been studied in a market equilibrium 
setting. Martin, Skeie and von Thadden (2014) build a dynamic equilibrium model that exploits 
tri-party and bilateral repo markets microstructures (e.g. tri-party daily unwind) to explain the 
difference between tri-party and bilateral repo haircuts and explores market conditions leading to 
repo funding market instability. Infante (2015)'s macro model focuses on excess liquidity 
generated from repo rehypothecation and shows that high risk dealers could succumb more to a 
run of collateral from HFs than a run of cash from MMFs. Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2013) 
relies on the concept of information sensitivity and cash lender's uncertainty about the true market 
value of the collateral to rationalize the need for haircuts.  
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 The drive to understand how a repo run happens to a large extent came down to how repo 
haircuts are set and repo pricing works. Econometricians attempt to understand determinants of 
repo pricing, including its two key terms, repo haircuts and repo rates, e.g., Gorton and Metrick 
(2012), Krishnamurthy et al (2014), Copeland et al (2014), and Hu, Pan and Wang (2015). The 
determinants used are mostly broad market observables such as VIX (volatility of implied S&P 
500 index options), and LIBOR and OIS (overnight indexed swap) basis as the counterparty credit 
risk measure. These efforts are hindered, however, by a severe lack of empirical data, as most repo 
trades done by banks and dealers at the time were not subject to reporting requirements. The 
segmentation of repo markets does not help either. Tri-party repo data and statistics, whilst more 
readily available, may not bear much relevance to the more dynamic yet opaque bilateral repo 
market where less liquid, lower credit papers are more likely to be accepted. Conclusions drawn 
from different data sets could be conflicting. Infante (2015), for example, shows that borrower 
credit is a determinant of repo haircuts, but Hu et al (2015) shows that funds set haircuts basically 
insensitive to their dealer borrowers.  
 These equilibrium theories and early empirical studies, while helpful in explaining the 
crisis on a macro level, do not lead to applied modeling that analytically links repo counterparties 
and collateral characteristics to predict or determine repo haircuts. Regulatory bodies, however, 
readily pick up their financial stability implication on the short term wholesale lending market. 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS 2010) 
conducted a market study on how market participants set credit terms for bilateral repo style 
transactions. Their finding is that there has been diverse market practice in tightening or relaxing 
securities financing terms, including varying haircut levels, shortening repo tenors, altering 
counterparty credit limits, restricting collateral asset eligibility, and rejecting certain counterparties. 
Concurring with the repo run theory, the Financial Stability Board (FSB 2015) responded by 
enlisting strengthening oversight and regulation of shadow banking as a major task and published 
a final document on the regulatory framework. The new framework, expected to be adopted into 
BASEL and implemented by the end of 2018, establishes qualitative and quantitative standards for 
collateral haircuts and governance structures.  To address procyclicality of repo haircuts, it 
specifies collateral haircuts on a counterparty insensitive basis to be estimated from 5 years 
historical data including at least a stress historical period. 
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 The industry is not without a view concerning the "theoretical uncertainty" (Comotto, 2012) 
surrounding haircuts, although it generally holds the belief that haircuts are procyclical and vary 
with borrower credit. Fitch Ratings (2012) finds that MMF calibrate haircuts based on the potential 
price volatility of the collateral assets, rather than on the financial strength of the repo counterparty, 
so that MMF haircuts are not apparently sensitive to the repo counterparties. The parties they 
choose to do business with are highly rated financial institutions, however, so admittedly it is 
difficult to infer whether haircuts are sensitive to counterparty risk statistically. Adding to the 
difficulty is that the crisis has also changed industry practice in haircut setting. Comotto (2012) 
notes that some sectors of the European repo market start to apply haircuts post crisis, and some 
counterparties, lacking haircut methodologies, apply BASEL's supervisory haircuts to repo trades. 
Findings from MMF haircuts therefore don't necessarily invalidate the industry's belief. 
 Concurrent with these developments, new industry practice and trends also emerge. 
Securities financing businesses have been adapting to various measures of reforming the financial 
system, namely supplemental leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), and net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR). In bilateral repos and bilaterally negotiated tri-party settled repos for non-
government collateral, repo tenors are on average longer than what used to be pre-crisis, most 
extending beyond 3 months, often with evergreen features2. Repos with one year tenor or longer 
are welcomed products for commercial and investment banks and insurance companies -- net cash 
investors which treat them as a form of short to median term investments.  Lengthened tenors 
obviously increase the duration of counterparty credit risk. Customized transactions are 
increasingly popular in what are dubbed as structured repos. In collateral upgrade trades (or 
collateral swaps), for example, the parties' collateral haircut differentials drive the economics of 
the trades. Dynamic haircuts designed to delever the trades are still rare but not impossible. 
Meanwhile, broker/dealers and banks are required to fair value repos placed in the trading book, 
with repo counterparty credit risk explicitly measured and managed (BCBS, 2016). Lengthened 
tenors, new structured features, and fair value requirement all necessitate consideration of 
                                                 
2 As an example, a repo is called '4/3/4' evergreen, meaning that the original repo term is 4 months and that with 3 
months remaining, it can be extended, i.e., closed out and a new 4 month term repo is entered. If one party does not 
agree to the extension, it will run off the remaining 3 month term. Other popular evergreens include '6/5/6', '9/6/9' and 
'12/9/12'. Lengthened repo tenors may correlate with the introduction of regulatory ratios, e.g., BASEL LCR requires 
coverage of a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario and 1 year time horizon of NSFR, subject to final ratios assigned 
to repos. 
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counterparty credit risk and interaction between haircuts and borrower credit, the main subject of 
this research.  
 To accommodate these developments, a robust modeling capacity of haircuts becomes a 
pressing need, especially considering that the intense efforts from academia, regulatory bodies and 
the industry have not been successful in establishing the exact mechanisms of haircut setting. From 
a modeling perspective, the intermediary access liquidity setup in Martin et al (2014) and Infante 
(2015), while a true phenomenon and helpful to understand how liquidity stress could develop, 
does not predict haircuts given a set of collateral assets and borrower characteristics. Furthermore, 
the MMF-dealer-HF setup is not universal, as dealers in the middle also borrow from commercial 
and investment banks and insurance companies who do not typically rehypothecate collateral 
received. That is when dealers could lose upper hand in haircuts and repo rates setting. When 
acting as lenders in either bilateral or triparty markets, these firms would treat repos as investment 
assets, e.g., secured loans. Naturally they would apply asset pricing approaches, which have been 
absent in the repo literature.  
 In "the absence of a clear understanding of the constitution of haircuts/initial margins" 
(Comotto, 2012), this article contributes to the literature with a haircut model for securities 
financing businesses. Departing from the general equilibrium approach, we look at repos from an 
asset pricing perspective and set out to build a mathematical model linking counterparty credit, 
collateral price dynamics, and market liquidity to haircuts. Specifically, we treat a repo as a debt 
instrument and adopt the credit risk pricing and management approach to haircuts modeling. We 
examine lender's loss profile during a margin period of risk as measured by expected loss (EL) and 
unexpected loss (UL) -- also referred to as economic capital (EC). A haircut can be defined such 
that its application results in a prescribed EL or EC target, with the former possibly matching that 
of certain credit rating criteria. Borrower credit risk is modeled with a mean-reverting, lognormal 
default intensity process. General wrong way risk (WWR) is captured via correlation between the 
intensity and the jump diffusion asset return process, while specific WWR is incorporated as a 
single jump on default, in the same spirit as a liquidity risk premium on asset disposals. 
 Another contribution of this article is introducing economic capital as the tool to handle 
repo's unhedgeable and undiversifiable gap risk and identifying cost of economic capital as the 
mechanism through which haircuts and repo pricing are linked. The main characteristics of repo 
risks is gap risk, a gap risk market exposure in a margin period of risk, contingent on a gap event 
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-- counterparty default. Repo gap risk thus crosses over two incomplete markets: the credit market 
where the jump to default risk can’t be hedged, and a collateral price jump risk in yet another 
incomplete market. Classic no-arbitrage asset pricing theory and the risk-neutral pricing 
framework do not address this type of residual risk. 
 By collecting a capital charge on EC, haircuts' impact on repo rates is established. The 
industry has long suspected that repo haircuts and repo pricing are related, although lacking of a 
precise specification. Obviously, a repo trade with a lower haircut should command a higher repo 
rate. On the borrower (demand) side, traders usually slide up repo rates by treating the haircut 
portion as if financed at their firm's unsecured level and fixing their overall funding cost in a crude 
formula written as hS+(1-h)R, where h is haircut, S the borrower's unsecured funding rate, and R 
the lender's charge, i.e., repo rate. Since S>R, a higher h leads to a lower R, i.e., a bank asking for 
higher haircut has to be ready to lower its repo rate ask. There is no known formula of similar kind 
on the supply or lender side, however.  
 Introducing economic capital in repo pricing also offers a better alternative in dealing with 
market procyclicality concerns than mandating a stable haircut throughout the business cycle.  A 
business in a credit expansion cycle, for example, can price a haircut at the current market 
condition, and fair value the repo trade, including the charge for economic capital which would 
move higher if haircuts are lower. While haircut is procyclical -- lower in expansion and higher in 
contraction, economical capital is countercyclical. This haircut - EC tandem naturally deters 
market instability when haircuts alone is the pricing driver.  
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamics of asset price 
and counterparty credit. Section 3 defines haircuts, conducts preliminary haircut calculations to 
show the model's ability to explain certain stylized facts, including tri-party and bilateral repo 
haircut difference puzzle, and a case study on how the model could be used pre-crisis to determine 
haircuts for a falling angel --  Lehman Brothers. Section 4 discusses economic capital and its 
relationship with haircuts, especially as an answer to the repo pricing puzzle and a tandem that 
offers stabilizing effect to the repo markets. Section 5 concludes with remarks and future research.    
 
2. Asset and Credit Models  
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A repurchase agreement (repo) is a form of debt or loan collateralized with certain 
marketable security and regularly margined to maintain a prescribed overcollateralization. A stock 
with a market price of $100 for example can be used to collateralize $80 cash loan, subject to 20% 
discount which is called haircut. To consider repo haircuts from a debt instrument perspective, we 
examine repo's credit risk profile. Economically, repo is a margin secured loan. The repo buyer or 
lender is exposed to the borrower's default risk with a market contingent exposure. The exposure 
depends on the duration of default and settlement events. A margin period of risk (MPR) is a time 
period starting from the last date when margin covering a master repurchase agreement is met to 
the date when the defaulting counterparty is closed out with completion of collateral asset disposal. 
The lender's exposure in a repo during the MPR is simply principal plus accrued and unpaid 
interest. Since the accrued and unpaid interest is usually margined at cash, repo exposure in the 
MPR is flat. Any shortfall from the sales proceeds to cover the exposure results in an unsecured 
claim which is pari passu to the counterparty’s senior unsecured obligations. Exactly because of 
repo's full recourse to the borrower, the overall lending exposure can be viewed from an unsecured 
wholesale exposure perspective. This is often necessary, for example, when allocating finite fund 
liquidity and evaluating investment performances.   
Suppose a hypothetic bank B and a client C enter a reverse repo transaction, where B lends 
M(t) amount of cash to client C on ∆(t) units of collateral security with a price process B(t). At a 
constant haircut h, M(t)=(1-h)∆(t)B(t). Party B would have a residual wholesale exposure to party 
C in the senior unsecured rank of (M(τ)-∆(τ)B(τ +u)(1-g))+ where τ is the default time of the 
counterparty, u is the MPR. Denote Rc C’s recovery rate, Гc(t) C’s default indicator, 1 if τ≤t , 0 
otherwise. g is a constant discount at sales to reflect market liquidity risk, 1>g≥0. We write B’s 
loss function at time t as follows,  
 𝐿(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑅𝑐)Г𝑐(𝑡)∆𝜏(𝐵𝜏(1 − ℎ) − 𝐵𝜏+𝑢(1 − 𝑔))
+
,    )1(  
Or in a differential form, 
 𝑑𝐿(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑅𝑐)∆𝑡(𝐵𝑡(1 − ℎ) − 𝐵𝑡+𝑢(1 − 𝑔))
+𝑑Г𝑐(𝑡)    )2(  
The loss given default 1-Rc is applied to reflect the repo's recourse on borrower C. For (rare) non-
recourse repos, one can simply set Rc to zero.  
 Following the reduced form default modeling framework, the default time τ has a default 
intensity λc(t). Corporate credit spreads are shown to exhibit log OU (Ornstein-Uhlenbeck) 
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behavior (Duffie 2011) which is positive, mean-reverting, and highly elastic in that it allows large 
moves in credit spread due to its log scale. In the log OU model, λc(t) is written as follows, 
 𝜆𝑐(𝑡) = e
𝑦(𝑡), 
 𝑑𝑦(𝑡) = 𝑘(?̅? − 𝑦(𝑡))𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑐𝑑𝑊𝑐(𝑡)     )3(  
where k is the mean reversion rate, ?̅? the mean reversion level, σc credit spread volatility, and dWc(t) 
a Brownian motion defined in a proper probability space (Ω,Ƒ,P). 
 For the asset price, we choose the double exponential jump-diffusion (DEJD, Kou 2002) 
model, capable of producing a wide variety of skewed tail distributions even with a short time 
horizon while maintaining tractable transform analytics, including numerical Laplace inversion 
procedures with error controls (Cai, Kou, and Liu 2014) and explicit density functions for DEJD 
(Ramezani and Zeng 2007) to allow maximum likelihood estimation of model parameters. A single 
asset's jump diffusion price process B(t) is written as follows, 
 
𝑑𝐵(𝑡)
B(𝑡−)
=µdt+𝜎𝑎d𝑊𝑎(t)+ ∑  (𝑒
Yj-1)dN(t)𝑗       )4(  
 𝑋𝑡 = log (
𝐵𝑡
𝐵0
) = 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜎𝑎𝑊𝑡 + ∑ 𝑌𝑗
𝑁𝑡
𝑗=1  
where σa is the asset volatility, µ the asset return, Wa(t) a Brownian motion, N(t) a Poisson process 
with intensity λ, and Yj a random variable denoting the magnitude of the j-th jump. With DEJD, 
Yj, j=1, 2, ..., are a sequence of independent and identically distributed mixed-exponential random 
variables with the pdf fY(x) given by 
 𝑓𝑌(𝑥) = 𝑝𝑢𝜂𝑒
−𝜂𝑥𝐼{𝑥 ≥ 0} + 𝑞𝑑𝜃𝑒
𝜃𝑥𝐼{𝑥 < 0}     )5(  
where pu and qd are up jump and down jump switching probabilities, pu+qd=1. The up jump 
mixture is exponentially distributed at a rate of η>1. Similarly θ>0 is down jump mixture’s rate.  
The asset price process is correlated with the intensity, <dWc(t), dWa(t)> = ρdt, ρ the 
correlation between the asset return and default intensity. dWa can be written in a factor form, 
𝑑𝑊𝑎 = 𝜌𝑑𝑊𝑐 + √1 − 𝜌2𝑑𝑊, where dW is independent of dWc(t). 
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The logOU spread model, while empirically supported, is known for its lack of analytical 
tractability. A Monte Carlo simulation is commonly needed. Suppose that we simulate a path of 
Wc(t), Ƒc ={Wc(t), 0≤t≤T}. It then leads to a path of y(t), yF(t). Conditioning on Ƒc, B(t) has a 
changed drift term but otherwise remains a DEJD process, as listed below,  
 
𝐵(𝑇)
𝐵(𝑡−)
|F𝑐 = exp (α(t, T, 𝑊𝑐) + σ𝑎√1 − 𝜌2(W(T) − W(t))) ∏ 𝑒
𝑌𝑖𝑁(𝑇)
𝑖=𝑁(𝑡)  
 𝑋𝑡(T)|F𝑐 = log (
𝐵𝑇
𝐵𝑡−
) = α(t, T, W𝑐) + 𝜎𝑎√1 − 𝜌2(𝑊(𝑇) − 𝑊(𝑡)) + ∑ 𝑌𝑗
𝑁𝑇
𝑗=𝑁𝑡  
 α(t, T, W𝑐) = µ(T − t) + σ𝑎ρ(𝑊𝑐(T) − 𝑊𝑐(t)).    (6) 
 
Fix a time horizon T, the conditional expected loss E[L(T)] is 
 E[L(T)|Ƒ𝑐] = (1 − 𝑅𝑐)(1 − 𝑔) ∫ 𝑑𝑃𝑦𝐹(𝑡)𝐸[∆𝑡𝐵𝑡 (
1−ℎ
1−𝑔
−
𝐵𝑡+𝑢
𝐵𝑡
)
+
|Ƒ𝑐]
𝑇
0
  (7) 
where 
  𝑃𝑦𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − exp (− ∫ 𝑒
𝑦𝐹(𝑠)𝑑𝑠 
𝑡
0
)  
is the conditional default probability. 
 A negative correlation coefficient ρ captures the general wrong way risk. In what is called 
a specific wrong way risk situation, a counterparty’s default may cause a short term stress in asset 
classes it specializes or associates directly such as affiliates' debts. This can be captured intuitively 
by a jump-on-default, which in the simplest form can be implemented as an additional liquidation 
discount and added to g. 
Repo style transactions commonly operate either with fixed positions where ∆(t) is constant 
or constant exposure where ∆(t)B(t) is constant. The latter corresponds to a constant loan amount, 
which is the norm in repo, while the former is typical of a total return swap (TRS) funding 
transaction3.  
                                                 
3 As far as the margin account is concerned, the latter is equivalent to the use of the same collateral to fund the margin 
account, which alternatively could be funded with cash or government debts. This has a negative leveraging effect 
when B's price declines. Some may consider introducing price floors to limit the extent of this leverage for certain 
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To compute the tail probability of loss at time T exceeding an amount b, Pb=Pr(L(T)≥b), 
we again resort to conditioning to arrive at, 
 
 𝑃𝑏 = E[I{L(T) ≥ 𝑏}] = 𝐸[E[I{L(T) ≥ 𝑏}|Ƒ𝑐]], 
 𝐸[I{L(T) ≥ 𝑏}|Ƒ𝑐] = ∫ 𝑑𝑃𝑦𝐹(𝑡)Pr {𝑋𝑡+𝑢 ≤ log (
(1−ℎ)((1−𝑅𝑐)−
𝑏
𝑀𝑡
)
(1−𝑔)(1−𝑅𝑐)
) |Ƒ𝑐}
𝑇
0
  )8(  
where 𝑏 < (1 − 𝑅𝑐)(1 − ℎ)∆𝑡𝐵𝑡 . 
𝑏
𝑀𝑡
 is relative loss measured against the repo principal 𝑀𝑡 =
(1 − ℎ)∆𝑡𝐵𝑡, and Pr{.} is the cdf of Xt.  
 The second conditional expectation in equation (7) is an undiscounted put option with log 
return Xt that can be evaluated by inverse Laplace transform
4.  Cai, Kou, and Liu (2014) develops 
an inverse transform algorithm with both discretization and truncation error controls, which are 
separate for cdf and call option. For our purposes, such an inverse transform is run per path and it 
will be more efficient to apply the same transform setting to obtain cdf of Xt. Lou (2016a) revises 
error controls so that the same truncation and discretization parameters apply to the inversions of 
cdf and put options.  
 Pb is then obtained by running a Monte Carlo simulation on equation (8), so is expected 
loss as in equation (7). Zero correlation is a special case where once the survival probability can 
be computed separately, and equations (7 & 8) can be evaluated without the need of running MC 
simulation. 
   
3. Repo Haircuts 
 A haircut is a discount applied to the market value of financial collateral. There have been 
two distinctively different doctrines in terms of its relation to the borrower or counterparty. In this 
                                                 
high volatility asset classes. In the simulation model, this is relatively straightforward to capture and will be left for 
future exercises.  
4 Our choice of Kou's DEDJ model over other empirically well supported stochastic volatility jump diffusion (SVJD) 
models is primarily influenced by the observation that the put option is deep out-of-the-money and is over a MPR, a 
very short term, for which SVJD is shown to be less effective (Eraker 2004). The repo tenor however is much longer 
than the MPR, but the margining mechanism makes it less important, even if with the possibility of elevated jump in 
volatility. A closer examination will be left for future research. 
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paper, we use the term collateral haircut for counterparty independent haircuts which are used in 
the regulatory context, and repo haircut for counterparty dependent haircuts used in repo and other 
securities financing transaction (SFT) businesses. A collateral haircut is either a standardized 
supervisory haircut or a level determined with an approved internal haircut methodology, to 
discount the market value of securities posted to mitigate counterparty exposures in repo style 
transactions and OTC derivatives for regulatory risk capital purposes. The FSB haircuts framework 
(FSB 2015) explicitly excludes consideration of borrowers' credit quality: any such consideration 
would only increase the haircuts established without consideration of their credits. Lou (2016a) 
proposes a candidate collateral haircut model satisfying the FSB requirements where haircut is 
driven by the asset price volatility and market liquidity.  
 This paper focuses on repo haircut. It suffices to say that, in financing transactions, haircuts 
are negotiated, sometimes at cusip level, i.e., on a bond by bond basis. Good credit counterparties 
will ask for lower haircuts and are often granted. Although the collateral haircut is often associated 
with VaR (value-at-risk) of the collateral asset, Lou (2016a) introduces definitions based on 
targeting first dollar loss probability, expected loss and economic capital, with a view that these 
new definitions naturally fit when haircuts are counterparty dependent and allow us to unify these 
two doctrines in one framework.  
 
3.1. Definitions 
Under the first dollar loss criteria employed by some rating agencies such as Standard and 
Poor's (S&P), given a target rating class's default probability p, the corresponding haircut can be 
written as 
 ℎ𝑝 = inf{ℎ > 0: 𝑃𝑟(𝐿(𝑇) > 0) ≤ 𝑝}      )9(  
For rating agencies that employ EL based target per rating class, we introduce haircuts 
based on expected loss (EL) target L0,  
 ℎ𝐸𝐿 = inf{ℎ ∈ 𝑅
+: 𝐸[𝐿|ℎ] ≤ 𝐿0},      )10(  
The expected loss target L0 can be set based on EL criteria of certain designated high credit 
rating, whether bank internal or external. With an external rating such as Moody’s, for example, a 
firm can set the haircut to a level such that the expected loss satisfies the expected loss tolerance 
L0 of some predetermined Moody’s rating target, e.g., 'Aa1'.  
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 Apart from probability of default (or the first dollar loss) and expected loss, another 
common measure adopted in credit risk management is VaR of loss L(T) or credit VaR (CVaR). 
Given a quantile q, CVaR is defined as follows,  
  𝑉𝑎𝑅𝐿(ℎ) = inf{𝑙 ∈ 𝑅
+: 𝐸[𝐿(𝑇) > 𝑙|ℎ] ≤ 1 − 𝑞},    )11(  
 A typical value of q is 99.9% for one year holding period. Note that VaRL(0) itself is a 
haircut definition in Lou (2016a).  
 Fixing a haircut h, equation (8) gives loss distribution Pb as a function of b. Fixing b, Pb 
becomes a function of h which can be inverted to solve for h given a target level of Pb. VaRL can 
be solved by setting Pb=1-q, loss not exceeding b with the confidence interval q. Having 
determined VaRL, the expected shortfall of the loss ESL can be computed straightforwardly. 
Obviously setting b to zero goes back to the first dollar loss equation (9). It is useful for 
implementations to note that equation (8) is translational in h and b, i.e., Pb|h= Pb1|h1 where 
b1=b+(h-h1)B0. 
 Similarly with b fixed, E[L(T)] can be computed as a function of h to solve for haircut by 
definition (equation 10). Also note that with a sufficiently large haircut, VaRL(h) (equation 11) 
could be zero. 
 Repo, if viewed as a short dated private monetization tool for wholesale counterparty's 
financial collateral, needs to be designed to fulfill basic characteristics of money, that is, 
independence from carriers or holders of the money for ease of transfer. Since the monetization is 
between two private parties, economically there is no difference from a private secured loan. For 
a bank, it is natural to compare a reverse repo with its other lending activities. The industry's 
practice therefore concerns with the economic perspective of the monetization process, while the 
regulatory stand appears to be based on its transferability perspective. 
 The different perspectives of private monetization can also be seen from money market 
funds, which invest in debt securities characterized by short maturities and minimal credit risk, in 
order to maintain the lowest volatility in the funds' net asset values unitized at par. In the US, the 
overall maturity of assets of a money market fund must be less than 2 months, reduced from 3 
months in 2010 following the financial crisis. Money market funds are themselves heavily invested 
in reverse repos, lending money to securities broker/dealers in the triparty repo market. These 
repos are mostly overnight repos, the shortest tenor possible. As these funds are passive lenders 
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with very limited resources to actively manage their exposure, it is reasonable to apply haircuts 
insensitive to the identities of the borrowers -- the broker/dealers of similar credit quality and adopt 
a policy of throwing out bad apple as soon as it smells like it. Furthermore, because they are not 
in the market business, their desire of a stable par value works best if haircuts are made insensitive 
to market fluctuations or even countercyclical. Broker/dealers are in the business of market and 
have the resources to manage credit risk. When they turn around to lend the money in the bilateral 
repo form to hedge funds and asset managers, their haircuts can be designed in accordance with 
their clientile, which exhibit a much greater dispersion than the broker/dealers in terms of credit 
quality. 
 Counterparty independent haircuts and dependent haircuts therefore serve different 
purposes and are both valid propositions. Question becomes whether a single modeling approach 
can accommodate these seemingly conflicting views. While a typical wholesale credit approach 
would look at probability of default or expected loss in the whole duration of the repo trade, 
disregarding a counterparty's credit is equivalent to assuming the borrower's immediate jump-to-
default. From the repo lender's perspective, counterparty independent haircuts require capturing 
loss given default, while counterparty dependent haircuts cumulative loss incurred upon 
counterparty's default during the trade's lifetime.  With this characterization, we have unified these 
two types of haircuts in one modeling framework: collateral haircuts can be treated in a one-period 
model where the borrower is treated as if  having defaulted, while repo haircuts a multi-period 
model where the borrower's default probability in each period is taken into account. 
 The model discussed above works for securities lending transactions as well. A sec lender 
has a loss on the other side of price movement, i.e., when price appreciation over the MPR exceeds 
the extra margin of hBt posted by the security borrower. Expected loss of the sec lender would then 
relate to a call option payoff on the asset and the same analytics apply. In such circumstances the 
liquidity premium does not have to apply as the intent of the sec lender is to get back the same 
asset, rather than cash.  
 A bank determines trade haircuts in accordance with its business model and risk 
management capacity. If the bank treats the repo as a secured loan to be carried on its banking 
book, it then needs to set the haircut that produces the firm's desired lending profile for a wholesale 
exposure and price the repo accordingly. Take for example, suppose the firm is comfortable 
lending out to 'A' rated wholesale clients at an interest rate of x, it could charge the same rate in a 
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reverse repo with a 'BB' rated party, provided that the trade has a haircut designed to make the 
overall credit risk profile matching that of 'A' rated counterparties. On the other hand, if the firm 
conducts repo trading activities in the trading book, the firm may have to trade at the market levels 
of haircuts and fair value the trades. It is expected that the firm would have to manage its 
counterparty credit risk, treating repos or SFT in general as a class of OTC derivatives to some 
extent (Lou 2016b), such is the case when a funding is done through total return swaps, which is 
a form of credit derivatives. In the following subsections, we provide examples of the haircut 
model application.  
 
3.2. Predicting repo haircuts -- preliminary results 
In determining a fair haircut level for a banking book treatment, the bank can use the EL 
based definition or other definitions consistent with its credit policy. To illustrate, we consider a 
borrower with a roughly 'A' rated wholesale counterparty, borrowing for 1 year with US main 
equities as collateral. We choose a 5 year historical period from 1/2/2008 to 1/2/2013 when SPX 
500 index as a proxy of US main equities had a significant stress in the second half of 2008 and 
early 2009, at the height of the financial crisis.  
The borrower's spread dynamics is reasonably assumed at 90 bp initial and mean hazard 
rate level, mean reversion speed of 0.5 and spread log OU volatility of 1.50, i.e., k=0.5, ?̅? 
=log(0.009), σc=1.5, λ0=0.009 in equation (17), such that its 5 year CDS prices at 125 bp5.  The 
EL based haircut targeting Moody's 'Aa2' without giving consideration to the borrower's credit is 
15.53% (of collateral haircut) for an MPR of 10 days. With borrower's default probability 
considered, 7.98% (Table 1) suffices to reach the same 'Aa2' profile under zero credit and asset 
correlation. If the correlation is stressed to -0.9, haircut only increases mildly by 1.13%. Last 
column of the table shows that haircuts are less when the correlation is at 0.9, or right way risk. 
The correlation effect is moderate, easily understood from the over-collateralization nature 
resulted from haircuts, and is expected as the loss exposure lies in the tail of asset returns where 
the Gaussian component of the asset dynamics is not expected to have a significant impact. Take 
for example when the spread volatility is doubled, while keeping the CDS spread at 250, the haircut 
                                                 
5 Currently 'A' rated corporates have an average 5 year CDS at about 125 bp. This level obviously does not apply in 
a credit contraction cycle. 
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for a BBB client would increase 0.38% under -0.9 correlation. The general wrong way risk 
therefore is limited, obviously due to the short MPR and the much less pronounced EL after loss 
truncation afforded by haircuts.  
 
Table 1. Haircuts for hypothetically 'A', 'BBB', 'BB', and 'B' rated borrowers. DEJD model estimated to 2008-2013 
data (Est-1: (μ, σ, λ, p, ηu, ηd) = (0.1231, 0.2399, 79.7697, 0.4596, 169.96, 128.36), Lou 2016a), target 
equivalent wholesale credit rating of 'Aa2', under assumed correlation between equity return and credit spread, 
and stress market liquidity discounts. 
Borrower 
CDS Rating 
haircut 
rho 0 
hc change 
rho -0.9 
hc change 
rho -0.9, g 2% 
hc change rho 
0.9 
125 A 7.98 1.13 1.78 -1.27 
250 BBB 9.43 1.11 1.75 -1.25 
500 BB 10.85 1.09 1.73 -1.23 
1000 B 12.31 1.07 1.7 -1.19 
 
Specific wrong way risk could occur, for example, if a borrower posts its affiliates' debt 
instruments as collateral. A structural dependency stronger than the diffusion correlation between 
asset return and credit spread could be developed. The strongest one in fact is a down jump upon 
borrower default, which can be modeled as an additional liquidation discount added to g. Specific 
WWR with a 2% asset jump on borrower default has a further increase of haircut of 1.78% (fifth 
column in Table 1).  In this sense, specific WWR is very severe, but the real magnitude will be 
firm and product dependent. 
Obvious in Table 1, haircuts become a tool of credit enhancement to the borrower. For 
example, a BB rated client entering a repo can post additional 1.42% (=10.85%-9.43%) haircut to 
make himself a 'BBB' equivalent borrower with the same collateral, both trades showing out an 
equivalent top credit risk profile of 'Aa2'. For 'BBB', 'BB', and 'B' rated borrowers, the mean 
reversion speed and spread volatility are kept same but the initial hazard rates are set at 2%, 4.88% 
and 14.3% to produce 5 year CDS spreads of 250, 500, and 1000 bp respectively. These are just 
for illustrative purposes. An implementation should try to estimate or calibrate these parameters 
from single name CDS or properly chosen CDS indices, to be shown in section 3.4. 
The stylized fact that MMFs are counterparty insensitive (Fitch 2012, Krishnamurthy et al 
2014, and Hu et al 2015) when lending to dealers can be readily explained.  The separation between 
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'A' and 'BBB' rated borrowers is small, about 1.45% in haircut. Noting that street dealers normally 
fall into the rating band of 'BBB' and 'A', this is not enough a margin for unsophisticated MMFs to 
invest in their risk management capacities.   
In the results presented above, a one-year repo tenor is assumed, as wholesale credit risk 
management typically standardizes around senior unsecured exposure at one year time horizon. 
For trades of longer or shorter terms, one may want to convert to an equivalent one year credit risk 
profile to allow comparisons with a firm’s internal credit risk metrics to define haircut targets. Or 
one could scale the standard one year loss or default rate to the tenor in question based on piecewise 
constant hazard rates.  The PD and EL definitions of haircuts are not sensitive to tenors as they are 
scaled back from the standard 1 year rate to the shorter tenor (say 0.25 year). In the next section, 
we will introduce EC based haircut definition which will be sensitive to tenors and provide a 
significant enhancement in capturing repo's third key term -- maturity.  
 
3.3. Tri-party and bilateral haircuts difference 
Gorton and Metrick (2012)'s study of a high quality dealer's private bilateral repo data set 
shows dramatic increases of haircuts during the crisis, while tri-party repo data sets obtained from 
SEC filings of MMF and sec lenders (Krishnamurthy et al, 2014) and the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York's market survey and data statistics (Copeland et al, 2014) show mostly stable haircuts. 
The abnormally large difference in tri-party and bilateral haircuts, e.g., some 15% for private label 
CMO prior to Lehman's default and about 30% post default, is not apparent to explain. 
Krishnamurthy et al (2014) attribute the rise of haircuts in the bilateral markets to a credit crunch 
on the part of the dealers, while Copeland et al, 2014 leave it as an open puzzle. 
Intermediating dealers often rehypothecate the collateral assets received from leverage 
thirsty hedge funds in a bilateral repo to a cash rich money market fund via a tri-party repo, keeping 
the excess cash liquidity created by the haircut difference to fund their own securities operations. 
This MMF-dealer-HF back-to-back trade becomes a natural setup to study haircut differences. 
Infante (2015) develops a two period equilibrium model for the funding intermediation among 
three agents (MMF, dealer, and HF) and builds into the model asset volatility for the bilateral repo 
of the intermediary but leaves it out in the triparty leg, which is on the same collateral. This 
inconsistency is acknowledged to have contributed to the model's ability to fit the stylized fact of 
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triparty repo's insensitivity to heightened volatility. Our micro market and credit risk model is 
consistent in that the same asset dynamics drive repo haircuts whether it is triparty or bilateral, 
although the borrowers involved are different. 
Dan et al (2013) use this setup to answer why repo haircuts exist and what determines the 
size of haircuts, theorizing on the concept of 'information sensitivity'. The MMF involved in the 
tri-party leg of the intermediary is less savvy about the collateral assets and uncertain about the 
collateral's true market value when time's come to sell in the secondary market where the buyers 
have access to information regarding the collateral's true value. Without access to the information, 
MMF lenders demand haircuts to protect them from the gap risk in a potential liquidation scenario. 
Dealers are supposed to have access to the information, and their demanding higher haircuts from 
HFs roots from their desire to gain extra funds to finance their own operations. Unfortunately, 
information sensitivity is not readily observable from financial products and markets. As such it is 
challenging to build the concept into an application aimed model of haircuts.  
 Access liquidity or "liquidity windfall" gained from haircut differences in repo 
rehypothecation is certainly desirable to dealers. It was real prior crisis and made possible when 
HFs mostly used only one prime broker. After Lehman's bankruptcy, prime brokerage 
diversification has taken place and it is doubtful that dealers are still in the same position to be able 
to demand this type of access liquidity without economic justification. In fact, post the crisis, large 
commercial and investment banks' share of the prime brokerage businesses have steadily increased 
and large hedge funds have keen interests in obtaining financing from the banks rather than from 
dealers who are of much thinner balance sheets. Note that such an access does not apply to the US 
treasury (UST) market as UST sees almost uniform haircuts whether in bilateral or tri-party 
markets, nor does apply to a large section of non-dealer repo market participants. Net cash 
investors such as commercial and investment banks and insurers treat repo as investment products 
and often don't rehypothecate collateral. Also, the most richly priced repos use collateral that are 
much less liquid and few MMFs are willing to accept. In post crisis environments, it is much less 
convincing to resort to the access liquidity as the sole or primary driver behind the haircut 
differences. 
 Our haircut model offers a new explanation of the haircut difference 'puzzle'. Dealers as 
borrowers of cash are of much better credit quality than HFs as cash borrowers. By looking up 
from Table 1, if we assume the dealer is 'A' rated, the MMF would charge a haircut of 7.98%. The 
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dealer would charge a 'BB' rated HF 10.85%, assuming zero correlation. Often times, an HF is 
highly concentrated in an asset class so wrong way risk is expected to be significant. At -90% 
correlation, additional haircut of 1.09% is picked up from column #4, and another 1.73% from 
column #5 with 2% liquidity premium or specific wrong way risk. All these add up to a final 
haircut of 13.67% for the HF. For certain asset classes such as private securitizations, a 5% 
liquidity premium is more appropriate. This would result in an additional 4.32% rather than 1.73% 
and the HF's charged haircut of 16.26%, comparing to dealer's being charged by the MMF at 7.98%.  
In fact, it could be prudent not to recognize their general, unsecured credit quality other than the 
assets. In that case, the haircut would be 15.53% without inclusion of any liquidity premium.  
 Another factor contributing to the difference is the length of the MPR. In the tri-party 
market the MPR is shorter because of its institutional efficiency in collateral valuation and 
settlement, while in the bilateral market, the MPR is longer due to trade customization, possible 
valuation dispute, and other bilaterally negotiated terms that could prolong the settlement process. 
With our model, longer MPR leads to higher haircut, just as poorer borrower credit leads to higher 
credit. If the MPR drops from 10 days to 5 days, for instance, the MMF haircut or tri-party haircut 
would reduce from 7.98% to 5.34%, further widening the haircut difference.  
 Similar to a shorter applicable MPR in the tri-party market, the repo tenors are generally 
much shorter than bilateral repos as already noticed by Copeland et al (2014). Shortened tenors 
reduce the duration of counterparty exposure so it naturally contributes to a lower tri-party haircuts, 
although it is not as direct as a shortened MPR, as seen from Figure 2 (in section 4). A repo of 5 
day tenor carries an 'Aa1' haircut of only 7% with a 5 day MPR. A three month repo carries 10% 
and one year 11.65% haircut. If the tri-party average tenor is in days, say 5 days, while bilateral 
average tenor is 3 month, then right there we have a 3% haircut difference. 
 With an analytic model at hand, an upper bound for the so-called excess liquidity generated 
by the repo intermediary can be established. For the first leg where the dealer gets funded by an 
MMF, the lender MMF would demand a haircut hMMF with the dealer as the counterparty. On the 
second leg where the dealer lends to an HF which can be thought as a counterparty of not much 
credit worthiness beyond what the collateral asset can afford. In this case, the asset only haircut 
applies and establishes an up limit of the haircut differential. Table 2 below shows the limit for 
main equities, where hMMF is set to target Moody's 'Aa2' rating with 5 day MPR while the bilateral 
haircut targets the same rating although at 10 day MPR. Obviously in the setup, the access liquidity 
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or the haircut differential shown in column 'hc diff' decreases as the CDS spread of the dealer 
increases, i.e., better credits earn higher access liquidity.  
  
Table 2. Sample access liquidity generated in a repo chain with main equity collateral, MPR=10 days. 'hc diff' is the 
difference between counterparty independent haircut of 15.53% at 10 day MPR and the dealer's tri-party 
haircuts shown in column 'hmmf' with 5 day MPR. 
Dealer Rating 
Triparty 
hmmf hc diff 
125 A 5.34 10.19 
250 BBB 6.46 9.07 
500 BB 7.56 7.97 
1000 B 8.7 6.83 
 
  
 The differences could be greater for securitized products, due to higher asset volatility and 
poorer market liquidity. Another factor should be considered is that securitization involves CMO 
style tranching of different credit supports. It is usually the case that the triparty repo market 
finances higher rated private label CMO tranches while the bilateral market would have higher 
percentage of lower rated CMO tranches. In Gorton and Metrick (2012) for example, there is a 
rating split of ABS/RMBS/CMBS products into 'AA-AAA' and '<AA', while Krishnamurthy et al 
(2014) and Copeland et al (2014) have no comparable rating subclass for either private label CMO 
or ABS. CMO tranching directly affects haircuts. In Jan 2007 for example, haircuts collected from 
HFs are 3% for 'AAA' rated ABS papers and 25% for 'BB' rated papers (Table 1 in Dang et al 
2013). Comparisons of private label CMO haircuts between triparty and bilateral repo therefore 
need to be understood with data granularity issues in mind.  
 Gorton and Metrick (2012)'s data set is highly relevant in this regard, where interdealer 
bilateral haircuts are compared side by side on the same collateral class with bilateral haircuts 
facing mid-sized hedge funds ($2-5 billion asset under management), as seen from Table 1 in Dang 
et al (2013). Haircuts' counterparty dependency is evident. For BBB+/A rated corporate bonds in 
Jan 2009, for instance, the bilateral haircuts are 0-5% with banks and 35%-40% with HFs, thus a 
bank-HF difference of at least 30%. In Jan 2007, the bank-HF difference is much smaller, at about 
10%. Note that in our model, the tri-party haircuts are considered as if bilateral haircuts where the 
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dealer bank is the borrower and the MMF is the lender. So this haircut difference is essentially 
same as tri-party and bilateral haircut difference in question. 
 In Table 3 we estimate the DEDJ model from Bank of America Merrill Lynch 'AA' rated 
credit cards ABS historical data and compute haircuts for 2H2007, 1H2008, and 2H2008, 
assuming 3% liquidity discount in 2H2007 and 5% in 1H2008 and 2H2008. With other quality 
dealer banks as borrowers, the predicted haircuts are in the range of the quality dealer's haircuts in 
each period. With HFs as borrowers, if we assumes no credit enhancement from HF counterparties, 
then asset only haircuts (or collateral haircuts from row "Asset+g") are applicable, the difference 
between predicted and the quality dealer's haircuts are around 15% for these three periods. This 
large difference could be attributed to the dealer bank's drive and ability to access liquidity by 
acting as funding intermediary. Or it could relate to "expected future volatility" -- a significant 
driver revealed in the regression of bilateral haircuts (Gorton and Metrick 2012).  The expected 
future volatility is a forward looking measure defined as the average absolute weekly gap in the 
credit spreads of ABS in the next four weeks. In our model, the asset volatility is realized 
(estimated to historical data6), so it remains possible that some sort of expected future volatility 
could contribute to haircuts. Such a measure obviously is not meant for asset pricing purposes, but 
its explanatory power seems to suggest it be worthwhile to experiment a jump stochastic volatility 
asset price model, e.g., Eraker (2004). 
 
Table 3. Predicted haircuts for 'AA" rated credit card ABS based on Bank of America Merrill Lynch historical data, 
targeting 'Aaa' rating with 10 day MPR. The row 'AssetOnly' does not give counterparty any credit so it can 
be used as a proxy for HF. Next row 'Asset+g' shows haircuts with g=3% for 2H2007 and 5% for 1H2008 
and 2H2008. Last row 'Bank+g' shows haircuts with JPM as a proxy for banks. Numbers in the last two rows 
are from Table 1. Panel A, Dang et al (2013). 
  2H2007 1H2008 2H2008 
AssetOnly 1.9 2.9 13.6 
Asset+g 4.8 7.7 17.8 
Bank+g 3.5 6.3 11.3 
A-AAA Banks 0-5% 5-15% 15-20% 
AA-AAA HFs 20% 25% 30% 
                                                 
6 Mortgage backed and asset backed securities markets are known of lesser liquidity and a pricing basis with their 
synthetic product kin during the crisis. It is possible that the quality dealer bank had quoted its haircuts based on 
synthetic indices rather than cash bond prices, e.g., using CMBX.AA for CMBS AA bonds. And lacking a synthetic 
index like CMBX or ABX.HE, other sectors' cash bond marking could have impacted towards lower price volatility. 
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To summarize, we consider the tri-party and bilateral haircuts difference to be of economic 
substance, explained by the borrower credit quality, the length of their credit risk exposure window, 
and settlement periods. While we don't rule out dealers' motivation to access liquidity, economic 
circumstances will be the persistent factor behind the known puzzle.  
 
3.4. Repo haircuts case study -- Lehman Brothers 
 
In this subsection, we conduct a case study as how a bank could have applied the model 
presented in this article while providing financing to Lehman Brothers during the 2007-2008 
financial crisis. This is purely hypothetical, as Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2014) already show 
that the market value of tri-party repo collateral Lehman posted reduced by more than half in the 
last week of its public service, and there is no data showing the size of its bilateral repo book.  
Following Gorton and Metrick (2012), we divide the development of the financial crisis into 4 
periods, the first half of 2007 (1H2007), the second half of 2007 (2H2007), the first half of 2008 
(1H2008), and the second half of 2008 (2H2008). The last trading dates of these four periods are 
respectively on 6/29/2007, 12/31/2007, 6/30/2008, and 9/12/2008 when Lehman's problem is well 
known and its CDS traded last day.  
We assume that the bank keeps track of the asset classes it provides financing by 
conducting historical data estimation of the DEJD asset model, with a 5 year historical period, 
including a recent stress period. Obviously since new stresses were developing during the crisis, 
the 5 year period is simply the 5 year ending with the last trading day of each period, e.g., for 
1H2007, it starts on 7/1/2002 and ends on 6/29/2007. Table 4 shows 1, 5 and 10 days 99% VaR 
directly estimated from the Bank of America Merrill Lynch's 5 to 10 year average life CMBS 'AA' 
price return time series. The 10 day VaR doubled from 2H2007 to 1H2008, then nearly quadrupled 
from 1H2008 t0 2H2008. Since VaR is used as a haircut for regulatory purposes (Lou 2016a), this 
trend flashes out sharp haircut increases, as later reported in Gorton and Metrick (2012). 
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Table 4. CMBS AA 5 to 10 year average life bond 99% VaR estimated with 5 year historical price return data upto 
1st half of 2007, 2nd half of 2007, 1st half of 2008, and 2nd half of 2008, for MPRs of 1, 5 and 10 days. 
Sharp increases in VaR are observed from 2H2007 to 2H2008.   
VaR(%) 1-d 5-d 10-d 
1H2007 0.88 1.97 2.9 
2H2007 1.05 2.14 3.02 
1H2008 1.51 3.71 6.54 
2H2008 3.26 9.81 23.49 
 
 Having estimated the asset model, the bank proceeds to parametrize the credit model for 
its borrowers. Specifically, the bank considers both the risk neutral logOU model -- fitted to CDS 
market curve on a specific trading day, and the real world model estimated from historical daily 
CDS curves. Since repo tenors are short, one year in this exercise, there is no need to fit or estimate 
the full term structure of Lehman's credit curve. For our purposes, we pick the historical 1y CDS 
spread to regress to estimate the logOU model and bootstrap a default probability curve using only 
Lehman's 6 month, 1 year and 2 year CDS spreads, which are shown in Table 5 for the last trading 
days of the four crisis periods. The need for a logarithm model is evident from the multiplying 
jumps seen in these periods.   
 
Table 5. Lehman Brothers' short term CDS spreads as of the last trading date of the four cited periods. 
PeriodEnding 6m  1y 2y 
1H2007 0.08% 0.13% 0.19% 
2H2007 1.52% 1.44% 1.41% 
1H2008 4.43% 4.46% 3.87% 
2H2008 14.13% 13.69% 10.09% 
 
 The estimated logOU model parameters for these periods are listed in Table 6. The 
estimated volatility is quite stable but the mean reversion parameter k becomes negative for 
1H2008 and 2H2008, indicating an explosive rather than mean-reverting spread behavior as the 
broker struggled along the way to final default (yet still a surprise given its 6m  CDS spread is only 
14.13%). 
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Table 6 Estimated log OU model parameters using 5 year historical data of Lehman's 1 year CDS spread, for four 
periods each ending on last trading day of 1H2007, 2H2007, 1H2008, and September 12, 2008, the last day 
of Lehman's CDS quoted ahead of its September 15 bankruptcy filing. 
  1H2007 2H2007 1H2008 Sep-08 
k 2.4343 0.7935 -0.0212 -0.3584 
 1.2471 1.4272 1.4618 1.4673 
λ0 0.22% 2.39% 7.44% 22.82% 
λ-mean 0.13% 1.44% 4.47% 13.69% 
 
 Now suppose that the bank adopts a credit policy that targets repo lending at 'Aaa/AAA' 
rating. The bank applies this policy consistently, i.e., through the cycle. On 1H2007, while the 
asset volatility is low (as reflected from the small VaR in Table 4), borrower credit is good (as 
indicated by 13 bp of 1 year CDS spread and strong mean reversion), and market liquidity as 
measured by bid/ask spread is cool, there is not much need for a significant haircut and the asset-
only model predicts 5.25% haircut, in line with then BASEL II's supervisory haircut of 8%. With 
consideration of credit support from Lehman, the risk neutral credit model (assuming zero 
correlation with the asset return) shows 1.75% haircut, while the historically estimated logOU 
model results in 2.0%, see last row in Table 7. Another 1.5% could be added to haircut to take into 
account of the effect of bid/ask related market liquidity. 
  
Table 7. CMBS 'AA" bond haircuts estimated as the financial crisis unfolds in year 2007 and 2008. Column "Fitted" 
shows haircuts obtained by applying each period's last trading day's CDS curve to the rolling estimated DEDJ 
model; the "Estimated" column is for haircuts when the historically estimated logOU model is applied to 
rolling estimated DEJD model; 'Asset-Only' column shows haircuts without consideration of Lehman's credit 
quality. 
Period 
Ending 
Asset-
Only Fitted Estimated 
Gorton & 
Metrick 
 
Liquidity 
2H2008 28.5% 23.2% 24.2% 17.1% 5.0% 
1H2008 8.7% 6.1% 6.7% 17.1% 5.0% 
2H2007 6.4% 3.7% 3.7% 1.8% 5.0% 
1H2007 5.3% 1.8% 2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
  
 In the second half of 2007, problems in the subprime and mortgage backed securities were 
well publicized and the bid/ask for ABX.HE's senior tranches increased dramatically, hovering 
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around 5%7. At the end of 2H2007, the predicted haircuts were both at 3.75% level, although still 
low by sheer amounts, but roughly doubling what's before. In 1H2008, predicted haircuts almost 
doubled again. And finally when approaching Lehman's last days, model predicted haircuts are 
close to 25%, in the proximity of the asset-only haircut. Adding in the bid/ask spread, 30% haircut 
is not inconceivable.  
Of course, there were no haircut models like this during the crisis. Nonetheless, repo desks 
must have been able to incorporate these factors somehow; otherwise they wouldn't be able to 
produce the bilateral haircuts documented by Gorton and Metrick (2012). The column labelled 
"Gorton & Metrick" shows the mean of haircut of Table 2 of Gorton and Metrick (2012), where 
the 1H2008 and 2H2008 data are shown for the full year 'All of 2008' for 'AA-AAA' 
ABS/RMBS/CMBS. The average of our model prediction for the full year of 2008 is 14.65% with 
fitted curve and 15.45% for estimated curve, not too far away from their 17.1% mean haircut. In 
this sense, the model presented in this paper is simply a generalization and formalization of repo 
traders' existing risk management intuition.  
 
4. Repo Economic Capital -- Key to the Repo Pricing Puzzle 
  
 The difference between CVaR and EL is considered as unexpected loss (UL), a reserve 
capital measure formally termed economic capital (EC), EC=CVaR-EL. The VaR measure has 
been proposed to be replaced by expected shortfall (ES) in the newly proposed BASEL market 
risk capital rules (BCBS 2016, or codenamed "BASEL 4" in the industry), so EC can also be defined 
as the difference between ES and EL, EC=ES-EL. Naturally we can define a haircut to minimize 
capital requirement C0. 
  ℎ𝐸𝐶 = inf{ℎ ∈ 𝑅
+: 𝐸𝐶[𝐿|ℎ] ≤ 𝐶0},      )12(  
where EC is measured either as CVaR or ES subtracted by EL.  
EC based definition is different as it is new and there is no standard definition for EC targets. 
We propose to set EC targets based an economic pricing equivalency to EL. Specifically, for a 
letter rating's one year EL target, we treat it as the risk charge per annum. The EC target then 
                                                 
7 There were days when dealers sent out runs showing a bid/ask spread of 10 points... 
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produces the same charge per annum under an assumed ROE, i.e., EC target equals to EL target 
divided by ROE.  
 
4.1. Maturity effect 
To highlight the difference between EL defined haircuts and EC defined haircuts, we first 
show EC's variation as repo tenor increases under fixed trade haircuts of 5%, 7.5%, and 10% on 
SPX 500 collateral. Obviously at lower trade haircut, there is more significant EC. And EC 
increases as tenor increases in a non-linear fashion.  
 
 
Figure 1. Expected shortfall varies as repo maturity increases. 'BBB' rated borrower assumed CDS of 250 
bp, uncorrelated with SPX 500, MPR=10 days, under three trade haircuts of 5%, 7.5%, and 10%. 
 
Suppose that dealer banks A and B adopt EL and EC based definitions respectively. Bank 
A targets Moody's 'Aa1' rating and charges 9.04% haircut to a top quality dealer bank on a one 
year term repo with SPX 500 collateral. Bank B targets on ES at q=99.9% and will have to charge 
a much higher 15.92% haircut, assuming 10% ROE used to convert 'Aa1' EL rate to EC rate as 
described earlier. If the repo tenor is reduced to 1 month, Bank A basically sees the same haircut, 
while bank B sees a reduced 12.24% haircut. This example illustrates that EL based haircut 
definition is not sensitive to maturity but EC based definition is.     
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If we scale the ES target such that bank B also sees the same 9.04% haircut for the one year 
repo, then applying the scaled ES target to 1 month repo results in a haircut of 2.62%. This way of 
scaling by matching EL based haircut therefore yields a more dramatic haircut reduction due to 
maturity shortening. Figure 2 plots this maturity effect on haircuts for the tenor range of 10 days 
to 250 days. As shown, EL based haircuts ("HC-EL-10" for 10 day MPR and EL based definition 
and "HC-EL-5" for 5 day MPR) are flat in the first half of the tenor range and slightly inclined due 
to the CDS's upward sloping term structure from 6 month to 1 year. EC based haircuts ("HC-ES-
10" for 10 day MPR and ES based definition and "HC-ES-5" for 5 day MPR), however, show a 
clear tendency of compacting on shorter tenors. The haircut decreases faster with shorter tenors.  
This graph is relevant to the "flight from maturity" (Gorton, Metrick and Xie 2014) or 
maturity compression phenomenon where lenders tend to shorten the tenors of their lending during 
a time of greater uncertainty or distress. One way to deal with foreseeable uncertainty is to raise 
the haircuts while keeping the same tenor, as in the bilateral repo markets during the crisis (Gorton 
and Metrick 2012). An alternative is to reduce the tenor while keeping the same haircut level, or 
to reduce the tenor and raise the haircuts. Since in the normal circumstances, reducing tenor could 
afford reduced haircuts (Figure 2 dashed lines), keeping the same haircut then amounts to a 
counter-measure for impeding stress. This nonetheless can only be captured if we adopt the EC 
based haircut definition.  
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Figure 2. Haircuts vary with repo tenors when EL target and EC/ES target are used, for a counterparty of a 
spot CDS curve (6m, 1y, 2y) = (47.5, 61.3, 75.3) bps. 'HC-EL-10' is haircuts via EL definition with 
10 day MPR targeting 'Aa1' rating, 'HC-ES-10' via EC/ES with 10 day MPR normalized such that 
its ES target produces the same haircut for 1y term repo as EL target. 'HC-EL-5' and 'HC-ES-5' are 
the same but with 5 day MPR. 
 
4.2. Risk charge versus capital charge 
Obviously the EC measure (the second moment) is more direct than expectation (the first 
moment) in terms of heightened market volatilities or uncertainty. It is no surprise that EC based 
haircut but not EL based haircut can help explain the maturity compression phenomenon. A more 
extensive comparison of EL and EC in the repo pricing context follows. 
In examples below (Table 8), we show economic capital of a repo transaction with the 
borrower's 5y CDS at 125 bp and a correlation coefficient with SPX500 at -90%. Assuming trade 
haircuts of 5%, 7.5%, and 10%, we use estimated SPX500 to compute a one-year term repo's EL 
and EC based on VaR and ES. Assuming a 15% ROE, at 5% haircut, the EL charge is only 0.47 
bp but its capital charge is 46.68 bp. At 10% haircut, EL charge is negligible at 0.05 bp but the 
economic capital (ES) is still sizable and there is 7 bp capital charge. This shows that in repo-style 
transaction pricing, cost of capital contributes to repo spreads much more than expected loss or the 
risk charge.  
 
Table 8. Repo pricing from risk charge (EL) and capital charge for a borrower of 5y CDS at 125 bp with 
correlation to SPX500 at -0.9, assuming 10 day MPR, q=99.9%. 
\Trade HC 5% 7.50% 10% 
EL (bp) 0.47 0.17 0.05 
EC (%) 1.79 0.29 0.00 
ES (%) 3.11 1.61 0.47 
Cap Chrg (bp) 46.68 24.18 7.08 
 
In section 3.2, we have predicted haircuts targeting Moody's 'Aa2' rating which carries a 
one-year loss rate of 0.00075%, or 0.075 bp. The loss rate is equivalent to EL in one year. So for 
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a repo trade that has a haircut designed to meet 'Aa2' rating, the standard finance theory would 
price the credit risk in about the same number of bps, which is obviously immaterial for a live repo 
trade.  Even if at the single 'A' rating, the loss rate or expected loss of 0.598 basis point (bp) is not 
material. At the 'Baa2' level, the risk charge (aka EL) is 9.35 bp, more meaningful to be a 
component of the repo rate.  
In fact we can plot the expected loss as a function of haircuts, showing out as a convex 
curve in Figure 3 below. The EL curve starts at about 2% at zero haircut, drops to 0.1% at 8% 
haircut, 0.01% at 12% haircut, and 0.001% at 15% haircut. For the same range of haircuts plotted 
in Figure 3, we compute CVaR and ES at 99.9-percentile, apply a 10% return on capital to arrive 
at a capital charge, and plot the perceived capital charge. Note these EC measures are computed 
assuming no credit support from the counterparty, to focus on haircuts. As expected, ES charge is 
greater than CVaR based charges as ES is always greater than CVAR. The capital charge curves 
are rather linear until they drop to zero at some haircut levels. If we set a small maximum capital 
level, then the haircuts required to meet the same capital level would be in an increasing order 
from CVaR to 99.9-tile ES.  
 
  
Figure 3. Sample risk charge based on EL compared to capital charge based on EC (VAR or ES) as haircuts 
change of a one year term repo, with MPR 10 days. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
1
9
2
0
haircut (%)
EL vs EC Charges
EL%
CVaR-99.9-Chrg
ES 99.9(%)-Chrg
29 
 
 
Another observation is that when haircuts start to increase from zero, the risk charge 
precipitates faster and crosses over the capital charge curve. Then it drops below the capital charge 
until to a point of haircut when the capital charge is also at a minimal level, say 0.01%. 
Suppose our aim is to set a haircut such that the total charge (sum of the risk charge and 
the capital charge) is minimized at 1 basis point, Table 9 lists the haircut sought in column labeled 
as "min HC(%)", comparing to 12% which alone produces 1 bp risk charge, and the rest of the 
table shows the risk charge and the total charges at selected haircut levels. If the standard is set at 
CVaR 99.9% as is in the current Basel 3 and the new market risk capital standard (BCBS 2016), 
the haircut needs to be 14.8%. Also seen from Figure 3, under CVaR 99.9%, the capital charge 
exceeds the risk charge except for the small range of haircut less than 2%. For all practical purposes 
where haircuts are greater than 2%, the capital charge therefore dominates the risk charge.  
This appears to at least partially answer the repo pricing puzzle (Gorton and Metrick 2012) 
that "the standard finance theory would suggest that risk simply be priced and the market price 
reflects risk and risk aversion of the market" (Dan et al 2013). As is a standard of asset pricing 
theories including CAPM, APT, and risk neutral pricing, the expected loss is discounted at the 
risk-free rate to arrive at fair value and will be passed to the other party of the trade. The expected 
loss is very small as the window of credit exposure is short and there is a substantial amount of 
haircut or overcollateralization. Yet during the crisis, both repo rates and haircuts shoot up.  
The key to the puzzle is that haircuts are there to mitigate the gap risk which standard 
finance theory does not address and repo pricing is dominated by the capital charge rather than the 
risk charge. The missing link be exactly a capital charge due to the economic capital. Note that EC 
is commonly defined for a credit portfolio, rather than a single trade as is here. Repo financing, by 
all means, is not diversifiable, always in large lump sum of notional, so defining EC at the trade 
level makes sense.  Traders often compute regulatory capital required and collect a capital charge 
on repo trades. Having EC estimated, a simple rate of return on equity (ROE) to EC can be levied 
and become a component of repo pricing.  
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Table 9. Minimum haircuts (in column "min HC(%)") needed to control charges below 1 bp and comparison 
of risk charge (row "EL-only") with combined risk charge and capital charge ("CVaR + EL" where CVaR 
is used for EC and "ES+EL" where ES is taken as EC.) 
  
min 
HC(%) 
Chrg (bp) 
@15% hc 
Chrg (bp) 
@10% hc 
Chrg (bp) 
@5% hc 
Chrg (bp) 
@0% hc 
EL-only 12 0.0011 0.0348 0.3949 1.967 
CVaR + EL 14.8 0.0011 0.5596 1.7798 5.424 
ES+EL 17.5 0.1211 0.6896 1.9098 5.544 
 
Since the capital charge dominates the risk charge, an agent may opt to control the haircut 
to minimize the capital charge. This is accomplished by equation (12). Noting that CVaR 99.9% 
drops at 14.8% haircut, we can use zero as the hurdle in equation (12) when CVaR is used as the 
EC measure. When using ES as the EC measure, a non-zero cut-off level has to be specified.  
 
4.3. Economic capital or regulatory capital 
The capital charge in Table 8 is based on economic capital, instead of regulatory capital 
(RC). While acknowledging regulatory capital as a requirement and the minimum cost of doing 
business, a bank's SFT business has to measure its trade economics in addition to regulatory capital 
requirements, which is not intended to dictate transaction economic terms. For businesses solely 
relying on supervisory haircuts, a repo trade could be and is often done at a haircut level lower 
than the supervisory haircut8 and would attract some regulatory capital. If the trade is compensated 
enough in terms of economic risk and capital usage (return on economic or regulatory capital), it 
could still be a good trade. A business would need a haircut model that estimates a fair level of 
haircuts given certain credit targets and compute economic capital if the traded haircut deviates 
from the fair level. Subsequently, a capital charge can be included in the repo rate, establishing a 
mechanism linking the haircut and repo pricing and adding to the list of determinants of repo 
pricing as a new and significant one.  
                                                 
8 For investment grade corporate, the BASEL III repo haircuts with residual maturity greater than 5 years is 8.5% 
while current prevailing IG corporate haircuts in the US tri-party market is about 5%. 
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 Regulatory capital can be computed in a straightforward manner and compared with 
economic capital. In the collateral haircut approach to counterparty exposure, BASEL III first 
determines an equivalent wholesale exposure as (E-M(1-hvol))+ where E is exposure or principal 
in a repo, M is collateral market value, and hvol is BASEL's volatility adjustment aka haircut. For 
a repo traded at haircut h such that E=M(1-h), the exposure becomes M(hvol-h)+, which is linear 
when h is less than hvol. For regulatory purposes, it needs to estimate loss given default (LGD) 
and PD (probability of default) of an unsecured exposure of its counterparty. The borrower's PD 
and LGD and repo's tenor (floored at 1 year) are input to BASEL's wholesale credit risk capital 
requirement formulae to compute regulatory capital. 
To further examine the difference between economic capital and regulatory capital, we 
compute and plot both EC and RC in Figure 4 for the one-year repo trade with a hypothetic 'BBB' 
rated counterparty on US main equities collateral. Based on BASEL III, the repo has no exposure 
when the haircut is greater or equal to the supervisory market price volatility of 15%, assuming 10 
day MPR. When haircut is less than 15%, the difference becomes the exposure which is applied 
with a risk weight of 191% assuming 3.08% PD and 60% LGD for the counterparty with a stressed 
correlation factor of 1.25 and a multiplier 1.06 applied. The regulatory capital increases linearly 
from zero to 2.3% at zero haircut. The economic capital calculated at 99.9 percentile ES has a 
maximum of 6.58% at zero haircut, about three times of the regulatory capital. Note that ES drops 
to zero around 15% haircut where the probability of no loss is greater than 99.9%.  
Figure 4 shows that regulatory capital over estimates economic capital in the range of 10% 
to 15% haircut and underestimates it when trade haircut moves further away (left and smaller) 
from the 15% cutoff. Comparing to the real economic capital, the regulatory capital basically 
penalizes low risk trades (when haircuts are high) and awards high risk (when haircuts are low.) 
Firms or desks that rely on regulatory haircuts to charge cost of capital should take a note. 
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Figure 4. Comparison of economic capital and regulatory capital for a sample 1 year repo trade with a 'BBB' 
counterparty (with 5 year CDS at 250 bp) with SPX main equity collateral under zero correlation, 
10 day MPR. 
 
In the industry, repo haircut is known to be cyclical (Comotto 2012). When credit is in an 
up-cycle, asset volatility is low, borrower credit is improving, and market liquidity is abundant and 
smooth, and a lower level of haircuts seems appropriate, leading to increased leverage. When times 
are bad, things are reversed with haircuts raised and liquidity squeezed, and deleverage could lead 
to downward spiral, resulting in an unstable market. This procyclical effect has led the revised 
regulatory framework to stipulate a counterparty insensitive and stable haircuts through credit 
cycles. Whether a stable through the cycle haircut is the best policy and/or business tool to ensure 
repo funding market stability is debatable. Traders would argue that repo's tenors are shorter than 
the time it historically takes to develop a market-wide stress so that there is no justification of 
fixing haircuts levels according to stress market conditions. For real SFT trades, collecting a 
constant haircut obtained from a distress experience is obviously counter-economic and punitive 
in haircut setting. Surveyed bilateral repo haircuts do vary below and above BASEL's supervisory 
haircuts, as seen from Martin et al (2014) and Gorton and Metrick (2012). 
The haircut and EC tandem in fact can provide a stabilizing mechanism to deal with repo 
financing procyclicality. With economic capital complimenting haircuts, in a credit expansion 
cycle, a desk can agree to a (lower) haircut at the current market condition, and charges (higher) 
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economic capital cost into the fair value of the repo trade, thus deterring the leveraging-up effect. 
In a down cycle, the haircuts move higher, but the repo pricing would be lower as the economic 
capital and thus its capital charge reduces, along with anticipated lowering of cost of fund, the net 
result is slowing down deleverage and preventing repo runs. Indeed the concern about haircuts' 
market procyclicality is caused by fixing a haircut and leaving it on an accrual or banking book 
where its counterparty risk is not actively managed, until market stress surfaces. Counterparty 
dependence and procyclicality are exactly the dynamics of the bilateral repo markets and 
requirements of a flow repo business that need to be tackled efficiently. This haircut - EC tandem 
naturally deters repo procyclicality when haircuts alone is the pricing driver and is a better 
alternative than mandating a stable haircut over the business cycle, as it both serves business needs 
and addresses regulatory concern on funding market stability.  
 
4.4. EC Sensitivities 
The main characteristics of the model is its counterparty dependency, which exhibits two 
effects: haircut determination per counterparty and economic capital after a trade haircut is fixed. 
For example, the predicted haircut targeted for 'Aa2' rating with a 'BBB' counterparty is 9.43% in 
Table 1, at zero correlation. If a trader wants to place a trade at a lower haircut, say 7.5%, economic 
capital has to be considered and becomes a dominant component of repo pricing spread. In this 
section, we provide additional computational results to show the model's sensitivities to relevant 
model parameters. 
In the low haircut regions of Figure 3 and 4, the economic capital or its charge are seen to 
be close to linear. This could be easily incorporated into an empirical study where the capital 
charge is included as a repo pricing determinant. Repo pricing data is extremely limited. Gorton 
and Metrick (2012) find that the bilateral repo spread relates to Libor OIS spread (LOIS), taken as 
a proxy of counterparty credit risk. As discussed earlier, EL, a measure obviously dependent on 
counterparty credit risk is not a significant pricing contributor once some nominal haircuts are in 
place. The EC charge has more and yet it is dependent on counterparty credit risk. Table 10 shows 
the variation of EC to four hypothetic classes of borrowers. At the moderate 7.5% haircut, EL risk 
charge (column 'EL (bp)') is only a fraction of the capital charge (column 'EChrg'). When CDS is 
at 1000 for letter 'B' borrower, the risk charge is only 2 bp, while EC charge is 64 bp.  
34 
 
 The elevated EC charge as counterparty credit deteriorates might not be able to fully 
represent the hike in repo spreads. Note that LOIS is not a purely counterparty credit risk measure. 
In fact it is also regarded as a funding liquidity measure. Lou (2016b) in fact builds in such a 
liquidity measure through an agency role of a liquidity provider and obtains a practical repo pricing 
formulae where the break-even repo rate decomposes into the cost of fund, gap risk economic 
value adjustment (GAP-EVA) for expected counterparty credit contingent gap loss, and economic 
capital charge in the form of capital valuation adjustment (KVA). With reasonable haircuts, GAP-
EVA is very small and KVA dominates repo valuation. LOIS's liquidity component could align 
the formulae through the cost of fund. This then offers a relatively rich capacity to explain 
empirical repo rates should such data become available. 
 
Table 10. EL risk charge and ES capital charge for borrowers of different credit quality for a one-year repo 
on US main equity collateral at fixed trade haircut of 7.5%. ρ=-0.9, g=0, MPR=10 days. 
 Letter/CDS ES(%) EL(bp) 
Echrg 
(bp,@15%) 
A/125 1.61 0.17 24.18 
BBB/250 2.53 0.36 37.92 
BB/500 3.41 0.85 51.12 
B/1000 4.28 2.19 64.26 
 
With regards to EC's sensitivity, Table 11 shows ES's response to shifts in DEJD 
parameters.  Given 1% shift in volatility (from 23.99% to 24.99%), when haircut is fixed at 5% 
ES will have an increase of 0.246% per unit repo notional, or roughly additional capital charge of 
3.7 bp if 15% ROE is applied. The sens to up jump rate and down jump rate (ηu, ηd) are asymmetric 
as expected, for ES is one sided tail measure. The average jump sizes are rather small for SPX500, 
so the sens to jump parameters are less pronounced.  
 
Table 11. Economic capital's sensitivities to DEJD model parameters shown for a one-year term reverse 
repo on SPX500 index with borrower credit at 250 bp, MPR 10 days, ρ=-0.9, g=0, at fixed trade 
haircuts of 5%, 7.5%, and 10%. Shifts are based on Est-1 (Lou 2016a): (μ, σ, λ, p, ηu, ηd) = (0.1231, 
0.2399, 79.7697, 0.4596, 169.96, 128.36). 
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parameter 
shift 
\delta 
ES-
hc5% 
ES-
hc7.5% 
ES-
hc10% 
σ 0.01 0.246% 0.246% 0.238% 
λ 1 0.005% 0.005% 0.005% 
p 0.01 -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% 
ηu 10 -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% 
ηd -10 0.056% 0.056% 0.054% 
 
ES sensitivity to market liquidity discount g is quite stable at 0.53% per 1% g for 5% to 
10% haircuts and these four letter credits with ρ=-0.9, meaning that 1% discount would incur  about 
8 bp in capital charge at 15% ROE. At typical 5% liquidity discount for securitized products during 
the crisis, this roughly goes to 40 bp. We have shown earlier that haircut is not sensitive to the 
general wrong way risk, aka, correlation. Neither is ES, for instance, when correlation increases 
from -0.8 to -0.9, ES has a small increase of 0.064% or less for these three haircuts and borrowers.   
 
The wrong way risk via correlation, although having a limited effect, does exert significant 
computational burden, for Laplacian inverse transform now needs to be performed on a Monte 
Carlo simulated default intensity path. Particularly with adaptive error controls in choosing the 
discretization and truncation parameters C and N to satisfy a fixed error tolerance (say 1E-10), the 
computational time for EC given a haircut can take an hour running 40000 paths in a typical 8-
core Intel desktop PC. Techniques such as importance sampling and customized quadrature for 
Log OU spread process could be explored to improve numerical efficiency. Noting the DEJD 
model is a constant parameter model, one could cache the first time period's simulation results and 
apply an interpolation scheme for the following time period to reduce the haircut calculation to 
few minutes. For corporate credit and EM credit analyses, empirical studies have generally favored 
log OU spread dynamics over an affine jump diffusion (AJD) model (Duffie 2011), although using 
the latter with a DEJD asset dynamics could result in two dimensional transform analysis, voiding 
the need MC simulation. While this is left for future research, desks sensitive to computational 
demands could run the model at zero correlation (which does not need to run simulation) and 
increase the market liquidity discount to compensate the effect of general wrong way risk. 
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5. Conclusion 
Empirical studies have shown that repo haircuts are collateral price variability driven and 
counterparty dependent. While practitioners have long linked repo pricing to haircuts, the co-
existence of haircuts and repo pricing at above the risk-free rate has been puzzling to conventional 
asset pricing theorists. We seek to develop repo haircut and economic capital models to understand 
repo haircut setting mechanism and its link to repo pricing. By treating repos as debt investments 
and employing credit risk management techniques, we seek haircuts to control counterparty 
contingent exposure to unhedgeable asset price gap risk. Haircuts are determined or predicted so 
that the credit risk profile of a repo as a debt achieves certain performance criteria, such as 
minimum expected loss or probability of default given certain high rating targets (e.g. S&P's 'AA+' 
or Moody's 'Aa2') or minimal economic capital (e.g. one year, 99.9-percentile credit risk VaR). 
The repo haircuts model incorporates asset risk in both volatility and jumps, borrower credit risk, 
wrong way risk, and market liquidity risk.  
As is expected of normal circumstances, haircuts are primarily driven by collateral asset 
volatility and market liquidity. This is consistent with Brunnermerer and Pederson (2009) in that 
haircut is predominantly determined by volatilities in both asset fundamental value and market 
liquidity. The liquidity draught facing securitization products following the subprime crisis, 
coupled with sharp increases in experienced volatility and anticipated future volatility, can explain 
elevated levels of bilateral haircuts observed by Gorton and Metrick (2012). Haircuts are only 
weakly dependent on counterparty credit and correlation between asset and counterparty. Since 
active dealers' credit quality are in a close proximity, this easily explains that money market funds' 
haircut setting is largely insensitive to dealers' identity (Copeland et al 2014, Krishmurthy et al 
2014, Hu et al 2015, Infante 2015).  
Secured by the same collateral, the model predicts that better borrower credits leads to 
lower haircuts. Since dealers as borrowers in the tri-party market are of superior credit quality than 
hedge fund borrowers facing their prime brokers (dealers) in the bilateral market, the tri-party repo 
market haircut will be lower than the bilateral repo market haircut. Taking the hedge fund's credit 
quality to the extreme, i.e., assuming an immediate and sure default, the haircut difference then 
sets a limit on access liquidity a dealer could gain by intermediating between money market funds 
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and hedge funds. In addition, the haircut model captures repo gap risk in the margin period of risk, 
a period starting from the last met margin call to the end of collateral liquidation. A longer period 
leads to a higher haircut. The tri-party market's superior settlement mechanism, in particular, its 
elimination of collateral pricing disputes, affords a shorter margin period of risk than the bilateral 
market. This and the fact that typical tri-party repo tenor is much shorter than bilateral repos also 
contribute to explain the haircut difference between tri-party and bilateral repo markets. Overall 
the model appears to have sufficient risk factors to predict haircuts that corroborate well with 
empirically observed stylized facts about repo haircuts and pricing. 
Needless to say, in live SFT trades, haircuts are negotiated rather than predicted. When 
traded haircuts are lower, a trader naturally expects to price up repo rates to compensate. We find 
that trade expected loss is very small and often negligible such that conventional risk neutral asset 
pricing theories (where expected payoffs -- or losses -- are discounted to arrive at fair value) would 
not have produced meaningful repo spread. This paper's main contribution is to direct the attention 
to economic capital, which can still be sizeable and entails a capital charge to compensate the 
lender's undertaking of the gap risk. Take for example, if a one year repo on SPX500 main equities 
is traded with a 'BBB' rated borrower at 7.5% haircut versus 15% of supervisory haircut, the 
expected loss is roughly 0.2 bp while economical capital charge is about 24 bp. EC based haircut 
definition has the advantage over the EL based definition in that it allows repo maturity 
compression or "flight from maturity" effect to be captured. 
Repo haircuts are known to be procyclical and overcoming procyclicality has become a 
major policy objective concerning financial market stability. Recognizing economic capital (EC) 
and introducing a capital charge in repo pricing offer an alternative policy and business tool to 
mandating stable-through-the-cycle haircuts. In a credit expansion cycle, market liquidity is 
abundant and price volatility is low, traded repo haircuts tend to be low, but lower haircuts lead to 
higher economic capital and higher capital charges in repo pricing, thus deterring an excessive 
build-up of leverage. Conversely in a contraction cycle, borrowers tend to raise haircuts, but higher 
haircuts result in lower economic capital and lower capital charges. A feared haircut-repo-rate 
double-spiral could then be avoided, because of the procyclical haircuts and the countercyclical 
economic capital forming a haircut/EC tandem. 
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The economic capital charge adds a new dimension to econometric studies of repo pricing 
and its determinants, which will be strongly desired once relevant data is available. More complex 
SFT product designs such as dynamic haircuts or other structured repo features are also left for 
future research.  
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